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NOTES AND COMMENTS
cially when the law in the particular situation, as here, has not already
been cast in a fixed mould. As early, at least, as the 1700's that course
had the approval by conduct of so eminent a jurist as Lord Mans-
field30 and there have been noteworthy examples ever since. If the
court in the instant case had followed that practice it is believed a
different conclusion would have been reached. At least in the case of
standard forms of negotiable instruments bearing printed seals clearly
described as such at the end of the signing lines, the intent of the signer
thereon ought to be regarded as sufficiently evident to require no jury
finding. Whether a like rule ought to apply to a printed "(L. S.)" in
a like place is somewhat more doubtful because of the element of am-
biguity but it may be noted for what it is worth that a limited inquiry
among intelligent laymen shows a considerable impression that such an
insignia, so placed, means "Legal Seal."31
The General Assembly would be well occupied at its next session in
devoting some time to taking up anew the whole problem of seals and
sealed instruments, including those of corporations, and declaring an
appropriate state policy for the present day.
M. S. B.
Contracts-Exclusive Agency-Requirement as to Definiteness.
In an action for breach of contract plaintiff alleged an offer by
defendant automobile manufacturer to grant plaintiff an exclusive sales
agency if plaintiff succeeded in raising $40,000 additional capital. After
plaintiff had raised the $40,000 by a sale of its stock, defendant refused
to perform. Held, on demurrer, that the agreement was too indefinite
and uncertain to be enforced.'
The increasing prevalence of exclusive sales agencies as a means of
distributing manufactured products creates new problems which test the
usefulness of old common law rules of contract. The familiar formula
that to be enforcible an agreement must be reasonably definite and cer-
tain,2 fails as an instrument of predictability. The types of agreements
which will be given or denied legal effect can be ascertained only by a
close examination of the provisions of agreements involved in the cases
where the formula is applied.3 Parties may enter into an enforcible
o See CAMPBELL, LIVms OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES (1899) 120, note.
"If this notion is widespread enough, it should make no difference that it is
historically erroneous.
:Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
2Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933)
(Amount of goods not specified) ; 1 WILLisToN, CONTRACTS (1920) §37; RESTATE-
WiENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §32.
'Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 201 Fed. 499 (C. C. A.
7th, 1912) (Model and price of cars not stated in agreement, but locality and time
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skeleton agreement, with details to be filled in during the course of per-
formance, 4 if the agreement may be tested by an objective standard in
the event of a subsequent dispute as to terms.5 However, if it appears
that matters of substance have been left for future negotiations, recov-
ery is usually denied upon the ground that, where the parties have not
come to a "meeting of the minds," the courts will not impose upon
them a contract they have not made. 6 A contract may be upheld as to
some matters, and denied legal effect as to others on the ground of
indefiniteness.7
In the modern business world it would seem to be almost a neces-
sity that parties to complicated sales agency contracts should not only
come to an agreement on such matters as quantity, sales price, commis-
sions, duration, expenses, etc., but should also incorporate such items
into the written instrumentas a means of guiding their performance
during the life of the agreement, as well as to .reduce the possibility of
future litigation.8 Detail would seem to be the rule rather than the ex-
ception. A skeleton agreement invites trouble. Courts operating on the
stated) ; Nebraska Aircraft Corporation v. Varney, 282 Fed. 608 (C. C. A. 8th,
1922) (Definite in number but indefinite as to price and models) ; Wakem & Mc-
Laughlin Inc. v. Culver, 28 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) (Customer's agree-
ment to furnish manufacturer materials for gloves, limiting invoices to 5,000
dozen pairs weekly, and requiring manufacturer's expansion to that capacity did
not bind customer to furnish materials for definite quantity) ; Marble v. Standard
Oil Co., 169 Mass. 553, 48 N. E. 783 (1897) (Agreement for defendant to sell oil
cheaply enough for plaintiff to compete in territory held too indefinite) ; Jackson
v. Alpha Portland Cement Co., 122 App. Div. 345, 106 N. Y. S. 1052 (3d Dept.
1907); Brandenstein v. McGrann-Reynolds Fruit Co., 56 N. D. 201, 216 N. W.
576 (1927) (Uncertain as to price, quantity; territory not clearly defined, and
commissions indefinite).
'Southwest Pipe Line Co. v. Empire Natural Gas Co., 33 F. (2d) 248 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1929) ; Kirkley v. F. H. Roberts Co., 268 Mass. 246, 167 N. E. 289 (1929)
(Territory of sales agent depended upon future action).
I McIllmoil v. Frawley Motor Car Co., 190 Cal. 546, 213 Pac. 971 (1923) (Model
and price of new car not definite but could be rendered definite by evidence
aliunde) ; Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N. Y. 223, 233, 111 N. E. 822, 826 (1916) (Dis-
senting opinion of Cardozo, J.).
IANsoN, CoNTRAcTs (Corbin's 5th Am. ed. 1930) §55; see (1915-1916) 3 VA.
L. Rzv. 640; (1915-1916) 14 Micr. L. REv. 600.
" Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920) (Con-
tract not definite as to time and quantity but large expenditures made and contract
was held good); E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.
(2d) 224 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) (Agreement making plaintiff sole state distributor
of manufacturer's products not void for uncertainty as to quantity) ; McCall Co.
v. Icks, 107 Wis. 232, 83 N. W. 300 (1900) (Number depended upon seller's
business and therefore in the contemplation of the parties).
8 Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co., 201 Fed. 499 (C. C. A.
7th, 1912), cited note 3, supra; Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Co. Inc., 65 F. (2d)
1001 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) (Terms and prices indefinite) ; George E. Wilcox Inc.
v. Shell Eastern Petroleum Products Inc., 283 Mass. 383, 186 N. E. 562 (1933)
(No obligation imposed upon plaintiff). See Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding,
42 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) for definite and detailed contract.
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gradually waning laissez-faire theory of contract9 waste little sympathy
on a plaintiff who has suffered a loss as a result of his failure to insist
upon anything more than a loosely drawn agreement.' 0 However, the
unfortunate plight of such plaintiffs has occasionally moved courts to
grant some semblance of relief,' 1 in view of the fact that it is usually
the manufacturer who dictated the terms of the instrument to an agent
of limited bargaining power who was improvidently willing to take what-
ever was offered him. By such devices as implying that the agreement
shall endure for a reasonable time,12 or that a unilateral agreement was
consummated,' 3 at least partial recompense is allowed to the agent.' 4
In the instant case the substantial reliance by plaintiff agent on the
promise of the defendant, with its resulting disastrous loss,'" gives rise
to; a feeling that the courts should have, if possible, overruled the de-
murrer. This is further substantiated by the fact that defendant's
demurrer admitted plaintiff's allegation that the agreement was to be in
effect for a reasonable time. The parties might have considered that
I .e., the practice of treating the parties as of equal bargaining power, a hands-
off policy, in spite of actual inequality; see cases cited supra, note 6.
" Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Co. Inc., 65 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933),
cited note 8, supra.
1 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920), cited
note 7, supra (No inequality of bargaining power but heavy investment) ; Eastern
Terminal Lumber Co. v. Stitzinger, 35 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1928) (Dealer
could recover for stock required to be purchased in seller's company) ; Abrams v.
George E. Keith Co., 30 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929) (Contract indefinite as
to time, quantity, and price, and terminable by either party on reasonable notice.
Held, since no notice was given, dealer was entitled to recover on his invest-
ment) ; Garlock v. Montz Tire and Rubber Co., 192 Mich. 665, 159 N. W. 344
(1916) (Dealer could recover for tires which he had been required to purchase).
"Abrams v. George E. Keith Co., 30 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1929), cited
note 11, supra (Contract indefinite as to time held to run for reasonable time) ;
Erskine v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 185 N. C. 479, 117 S. E. 706 (1923) (Dealer given
exclusive agency in certain territory; indefinite as to time; treated as continuing
for reasonable time).
" Brenard Mfg. Co. v. Miller & Robinson, 158 Miss. 892, 131 So. 274 (1930);
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §90; CLARK, CONTPRACrS (4th ed. 1930) §10.
'" Emerson-Brantingham Co. v. Lyons, 94 Kan. 567, 147 Pac. 58 (1915) (Ex-
penses recovered) ; Myer v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 156 Mo. App. 170, 136 S. W.
5 (1911) (Contract indefinite as to time; expenses paid. Held, if agent makes
expenditures in the matter of the agency he should have a chance to recoup them
or recover from principal); Hallstead v. Perrigo, 87 Neb. 128, 126 N. W. 1078
(1910) (Expenses recovered).
The existing cases in North Carolina seem to go in both directions. Thomas
v. Thomasville Shooting Club, 123 N. C. 285, 31 S. E. 654 (1898) (Where plaintiff
was to build barn in consideration for receiving patronage of shooting club, ex-
penses to be paid by club, held void for indefiniteness). (But see dissenting opin-
ion of Douglas, J.). Erskine v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 185 N. C. 479, 117 S. E.
706 (1923), cited note 12, supra (Dealer given exclusive agency in certain territory
and incurred certain expenses. Contract could be canceled at will of manufacturer.
Held, upon performance of condition, contract became clothed with valid con-
sideration which relates back and makes the promise obligatory. Reasonable time
allowed).
' The facts reveal that plaintiff was subsequently declared a bankrupt.
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the agreement was a preliminary negotiation, which, upon execution,
would obligate defendant to enter into a subsequent, detailed agency
contract.
On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the tactics employed
'by plaintiff showed little business foresight. It was a corporation al-
ready engaged in the automobile business, and therefore presumably
aware of the fact that it was assuming a disproportionate risk in raising
$40,000 in reliance upon a promise as indefinite as that of defendant.
The situation of the parties would seem to indicate, not a substantial
inequality in bargaining power, but rather foolhardiness on the part of
the plaintiff. It would also seem difficult to find a basis upon which to
calculate damages suffered for which the defendant should be liable.
J. D. MALLONEE, JR.
Descent and Distribution-Doctrine of Worthier Title
in North Carolina.
Under the doctrine of worthier title, a devise to the heir is void if
he takes the same nature and quality of estate by the will that he would
have taken by descent had the testator died intestate, owing to the
preference of the common law for title by descent.' At common law
the doctrine was a rule of law; there was no election in the heir to take
by descent or by purchase, because the descent was immediately cast
upon him, and the devise was considered as having no operation at all,
thus forcing the heir-devisee to take by descent. 2 This hoary dogma
arose out of the efforts of medieval landlords to preserve their feudal
rights,3 and of creditors of the ancestor to reach property which at that
time, if taken by devise, would have been immune.4 This rule was
abrogated by statute in England in 1833 ;5 it still exists in some of the
"1 MouRDcAi, LAw LEcTURES (2d ed. 1916) 648; PowELL, AN ESSAY UPON
TME LEARNING OF DEVIsES (3d Am. ed. 1822) 284; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY(2d ed. 1920) §487.
2 University v. Holstead, 4 N. C. 289 (1812).
'Campbell v. Herron, 1 N. C. 381 (1801). Where the owner of land was per-
mitted to devise his land, the overlord was deprived of the fruits of his seigniority,
the consequence of descent.
11 MORDECAI, LAw LECTUES (2d ed. 1916) 648. "This rule was made for the
protection of creditors, because after making bonds whereby they bound them-
selves and their heirs to pay money, the obligors would devise their lands to their
heirs, and, as such devises constitute the heirs purchasers, so to speak, they got
the land without having to pay the bond-not being liable on the bond of the
ancestor except when they acquired real estate by descent from such ancestor.
This pitiful evasion of an honest debt was upset by the rule above stated." It is
no longer necessary to apply the rule for this purpose because present statutes
make the -property of the decedent liable for his debts whether devised or not.
'3 & 4 William IV, c. 106, §3 (1833). This statute declared that when any
land should be devised by a testator dying after December 31, 1833 to his heir,
the devise should operate and the heir should take as devisee by purchase and not
by descent as heir.
